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“And this is one of the major questions of 
our lives: how we keep boundaries, what 
permission we have to cross boundaries, 
and how we do so.”  
– A.B. Yehoshua 
INTRODUCTION 
The boundary is a concept ancient to human civilization, appli-
cable to both the tangible and intangible aspects of our lives. Inter-
nally we deliberate moral or spiritual boundaries, while externally 
we struggle amongst one another to establish geographical bounda-
ries. Especially throughout the development of Western Civilization 
and democracy, in the least, boundaries have become an essential 
characteristic of the westerner’s individual freedoms. Albeit a doc-
trine of criminal law, take for example the Castle Doctrine,1 which, 
                                                                                                             
 *   Associate, Davidson, Meaux, Sonnier, McElligot, Fontenot, Gideon & 
Edwards, LLP; J.D./D.C.L. (May 2017), Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana 
State University. The author would like to thank Professors Olivier Moréteau and 
Randall Trahan for their guidance in preparing this note. Further, the author 
wishes to acknowledge the diligent efforts put forth by the Journal of Civil Law 
Studies’ staff. 
 1. See Castle Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 261 (10th ed., West 
2014); the Castle Doctrine is defined as, “[a]n exception to the retreat rule allow-
ing the use of deadly force by a person who is protecting his or her home and its 
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in essence, represents the value we as a society appropriate to per-
sonal boundaries.  
In the civil law, one may establish the boundary to his land 
through a boundary action. A boundary action is considered a real 
action. A person may bring a real action in order to assert rights spe-
cifically in, to, or upon immovable property.2 There are a number of 
real actions provided for in Title II of the Louisiana Civil Code, three 
of which were explored in the case presented herein, Hooper v. Hero 
Lands Company3 (Hooper II): petitory, possessory, and boundary 
actions. Each of the three actions considered in Hooper II are distin-
guishable, however, as we so often find, distinctions are not easily 
drawn.  
Hooper II takes up these real actions, as well as a trespass ac-
tion,4 which is not treated as a real action by the Louisiana Code of 
Civil Procedure, and considers some age-old disputes in Louisiana 
jurisprudence, much of which has assumedly been put to rest. How-
ever, there appears to have surfaced some slight disparity between 
circuits—particularly the First and Fourth—which are worth noting.       
I. BACKGROUND 
In 1860, following the long and controversial litigation over the 
estate of eccentric miser and real estate spectacular John 
McDonogh, a particular portion of his vast land-holdings was pre-
pared for subdivision.5 The land, known as the Cazelard Plantation, 
                                                                                                             
inhabitants from attack, especially from a trespasser who intends to commit a fel-
ony or inflict serious bodily harm.” 
 2. LA. CODE OF CIV. PROC. art. 422 (2017).  
 3. Hooper v. Hero Lands Co., 15-0929, p.5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/30/16); 216 
So.3d 965, 970, writ denied, 16- 0971 (La. 9/16/16); 206 So.3d 205 (mem) [here-
inafter Hooper II]. 
 4. Though it bears a resemblance to real actions, in that it concerns entering 
onto immovable property without permission, no attempt has been made to in-
clude, inter alia, the action for trespass within Title II. See Melissa Morris Cres-
son, The Louisiana Trespass Action: A “Real” Problem, 56 LA. L. REV. 477, 477 
n.5 (1995). 
 5. See Executors of McDonogh v. Murdoch, 56 U.S. 367 (1854).  
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was inherited by the City of New Orleans from McDonogh and lo-
cated generally in “down the bayou,” Louisiana,6 specifically en-
compassing lands within Jefferson, Orleans, and Plaquemines par-
ishes.7  The land was subdivided into 44 lots, each notably one ar-
pent in size,8 or approximately 192 feet wide, and was put up for 
public auction by New Orleans.9 As a result of the auction, Alphonse 
Camus purchased lots 17-26 and Pierre Cazelar, Jr., purchased lots 
27-44.10 Legal description was made and good title was recorded 
upon these transactions, of which was eventually passed to the par-
ties in the case before us.11  
Detailing the history of the property back nearly 160 years is not 
mere fluff to draw in the reader’s attention. The fact that the property 
was divided into arpents is not unsubstantial; indeed the issue in 
Hooper II was born of the lot measurements. Moreover, prior to the 
public auction in 1860, the City of New Orleans hired Louis Pilie, a 
surveyor, to comprise a plat of the property.12 Both plaintiffs and 
defendants in Hooper II relied on the Pilie plat for their property 
description.13  
The particular boundary in contention is between lots 26 and 27. 
In Hooper I, the plaintiffs, Patsy and James Hooper (the “Hoopers”), 
have owned lot 26 since 1992,14 while the Hero Lands Company 
                                                                                                             
 6. “Down the bayou” is a vernacular phrase used liberally by Louisianans 
when describing a broad area of the state, generally south of Interstate 10 (e.g., 
when one hails from Houma, Louisiana, one might say, “He’s from down the 
bayou”). 
 7. Original Appellee Brief of Defendants Hero Lands Company and Allen 
Hero, Hooper v. Hero Lands Co., No. 15- 0929, (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/19/15) (ap-
pellate brief). 
 8. See Arpent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1; an arpent is 192 
feet.  
 9. Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 969. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 973. 
 14. Hooper v. Hero Lands Co., 13-0576 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/11/13); 128 So. 
3d 691, 692 [hereinafter Hooper I]. Important to note for purposes of prescription, 
Hooper acquired lot 26 in 1992, in good faith and just title, from Burmaster Land 
& Development Co., who was also in good faith possession of lot 26 since 1974. 
Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 969. 
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(“Hero”), owns lots 27-35.15 The lots are situated laterally west to 
east, with lot 26 being the most westerly.16 Just as the Pilie plat de-
scribed each lot to be the same width, according to the titles, each 
lot is 192 feet wide.17 Therefore, the total width of lots 26-35 would 
be 1,920 feet. However, it turns out the distance is 2,040.77 feet—a 
surplus of 120.77 feet.18 Therein lies the controversy. Additionally, 
on the eastern side of lot 26 there existed a fence, which was main-
tained and considered by the Hoopers to be the boundary line be-
tween lots 26 and 27.19  
In 2012, Hero authorized the local government to dig a thirty-
five foot drainage canal on the western boundary of lot 27.20 When 
plotting the drainage canal, the government’s surveyor used the lot 
titles, which mathematically caused the canal to overlap across the 
boundary between lots 26 and 27. With the disparity unbeknownst 
to Hero and the government, preparations to dig the drainage canal 
commenced which resulted in a trespass onto the Hoopers’ prop-
erty.21 As a result, the Hoopers filed suit claiming trespass and as-
serting a possessory and boundary action, along with a request for 
injunctive relief.22  
The trial court granted temporary injunctive relief to the Hoop-
ers, enjoining the government from continuing to dig the canal.23 
Nevertheless, the government adopted a resolution to expropriate 
the property and continue the project, allegedly without notice to the 
Hoopers.24 The resolution to expropriate the land introduces a fold 
in the case considered in Hooper I,25 but not in Hooper II. 
                                                                                                             
 15. Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 968. 
 16. Id. at 969. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 968. 
 19. Hooper’s Third Amended Petition at 2-3. 
 20. Hooper I, 128 So.3d at 693.  
 21. Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 968. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Hooper I, 128 So.3d at 693. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 692.   
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Presented to the court were a number of arguments asserting the 
Hoopers’ rights to the entire surplus 120.77 feet, of which they 
claimed was encompassed within the fence line.26 Hooper asserted 
ownership of the surplus by “Possession Within Title,” arguing that 
the 120.77 foot strip of land “constituted the ‘more than one arpent’” 
as provided in the title description, “one arpent more or less.”27 Ad-
ditionally, the Hooper’s provided evidence of corporeal posses-
sion.28 Furthermore, by tacking possession to their ancestors-in-ti-
tle,29 the Hooper’s asserted ownership by acquisitive prescription of 
ten-years and thirty-years.30 Thus, the Hoopers asserted ownership 
by possession, title, and prescription.31 Finally, the Hooper’s prayed 
for the court to establish the boundary line.32 
II. DECISION OF THE COURT 
The court in Hooper II addressed the following issues: 
 
– Whether the Hoopers had improperly cumulated their pos-
sessory action with a petitory action;33 
– Whether the Hoopers had acquired ownership to the surplus 
120.77 feet of property: (1) by title;34 (2) by ten-year acquis-
itive prescription;35 and (3) by thirty-year acquisitive pre-
scription;36 
– Whether the trial court properly fixed the boundary.37 
 
                                                                                                             
 26. Hooper’s Third Amended Petition at 2-3.  
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. at 2-3. 
 29. The possession of the transferor is tacked to that of the transferee if there 
has been no interruption of possession. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3442 (2017). 
 30. Hooper’s Third Amended Petition at 2, para 5. 
 31. Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 970. 
 32. Hooper’s Third Amended Petition at 21.  
 33. Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 970. 
 34. Id. at 971-72. 
 35. Id. at 972. 
 36. Id. at 972-73. 
 37. Id. at 973-74. 
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On the issue of the Hoopers’ improper cumulation of a petitory 
and possessory action, the court reversed the trial court, ruling the 
Hoopers improperly cumulated, “demonstrated by [the Hoopers’] 
assertions of ownership by title and by prescription, and their re-
quest to fix the boundary line.”38 Thus, according to the court, the 
Hoopers waived their possessory action. However, as discussed su-
pra, the Hooper’s petition made no mention of the action being pet-
itory, as well, cumulation of a boundary action with either a petitory 
or possessory should not be considered improper—article 3657 of 
the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure overtly does not prohibit such 
cumulation.39  
With regard to the Hoopers’ attempt to show ownership by ti-
tle—a petitory action—the court found the addition of “more or 
less” to an arpent was not sufficient to show better title than Hero.40 
Next, albeit the Hoopers had sufficient ten-year corporeal posses-
sion, the court found the description on the deed to their tract insuf-
ficient to show the just title necessary to achieve ten-year acquisitive 
prescription.41 Further, the court noted that because the Hooper’s 
immediate ancestor-in-title, Burmaster Land & Development Com-
pany (“Burmaster”), leased lot 26 for the years leading up to the 
Hoopers’ purchase, Burmaster was a precarious possessor.42 To ac-
quire by thirty-year acquisitive prescription, one must have adverse 
corporeal possession; therefore, because Burmaster did not acquire 
ownership to lot 26 until December 31, 1989, adverse possession 
did not being until January 1, 1990—not soon enough for the Hoop-
ers to acquire via thirty-year prescription.43 
Despite the Hoopers’ argument that apportionment “foreign” to 
Louisiana law, the court affirmed the trial court order, finding “as a 
matter of law, [utilizing] equal apportionment among the ten lots [to 
                                                                                                             
 38. Id. at 970. 
 39. See LA. CODE OF CIV. PROC. art. 3657 (2017).  
 40. Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 971. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 972. 
 43. Id. 
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fix the boundary] was the correct method to divide the disputed 
property.”44 Nonetheless, the court realized that neither judgment 
had provided for a particularized description of the property as re-
quired by Louisiana Civil Code of Procedure article 1919 and, there-
fore, remanded with instruction to provide an accurate legal property 
description.45 
III. COMMENTARY 
Possession and ownership are separate things, which require 
separate legal actions to determine: petitory and possessory. Article 
3657 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure prohibits the cumu-
lation or alternative pleading of petitory and possessory actions, the 
penalty of such cumulation being the abatement of the possessory 
action. The intent is to encourage the determination of the posses-
sion prior to institution of a petitory action.46 It follows common 
sense as a petitory action assumes the petitioner has only better title 
to and no possession of the property. 
Hooper II made holdings that it was improper to cumulate a pet-
itory action and an acquisitive prescription action, as well a bound-
ary action cannot be cumulated with a possessory action.  
Primarily to note, Louisiana Civil Code of Procedure article 
3657 expressly states, “[t]he plaintiff may not cumulate the petitory 
and the possessory action.”47 It makes no prohibition, nor even men-
tion, of a cumulation of a boundary action with either a petitory or a 
possessory action, nor does it consider acquisitive prescription.  
Hooper II notes that a ruling on the Hoopers’ claim of ownership 
by acquisitive prescription, albeit consistent with a possessory ac-
tion, would “necessarily be a determination of ownership.”48 As 
such, the court reasoned the Hoopers cumulated a petitory action 
                                                                                                             
 44. Id. at 973. 
 45. Id. at 973-974.  
 46. LA. CODE OF CIV. PROC. art. 3657 (comment (a) (2017).  
 47. Id. at art. 3657 (2017). 
 48. Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 970. 
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with a possessory action, waiving their possessory action. However, 
as it turned out, the question was not so much whether the Hoopers 
were in possession, but to what extent did they possess; the bound-
ary had to be determined.  
Boundaries are not necessarily fixed judicially, but may also be 
fixed extrajudicially, through agreement by parties. In the instance 
judicial fixing is necessary, the boundary action must be brought by: 
an owner of the contiguous tract of land; one who is in possession 
as owner; or one who has a real right in the property (i.e., a usufruct 
or mineral lease).49  
Notwithstanding the possibility that the Hoopers failed to even 
bring a petitory action (to which the court was seemingly aware50), 
it is disputable the court was correct to assert that the Hoopers im-
properly cumulated a petitory action by claiming ownership by title 
and requesting to fix the boundary line.51 Petitory and boundary ac-
tions may be cumulated because, inter alia, they both seek to estab-
lish ownership.52 However, to boot, the court claimed improper cu-
mulation took place when the Hoopers asserted ownership by title 
and acquisitive prescription.53 Within the same paragraph the court 
contradicts itself, stating that a claim of acquisitive prescription 
“may suggest to a casual reader that [it] is consistent with a posses-
sory action . . . but . . . would necessarily be a determination of own-
ership.”54  
If a boundary action can be cumulated with a petitory action be-
cause they both assert ownership, and holding an action by acquisi-
tive prescription is a determination of ownership, then why not may 
a petitory action and acquisitive prescription claim be cumulated? 
At any rate, the Hooper’s possession was more or less a non-issue; 
                                                                                                             
 49. LA. CIV. CODE art. 786 (2017).  
 50. Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 968 (“In addition to the trespass action, the Hoop-
ers asserted a possessory action and a boundary action . . . .”).  
 51. Id. at 970. 
 52. A. N. Yiannopoulos, 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, PROPERTY § 
11:31 (5th ed., West 2016).  
 53. Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 970. 
 54. Id. 
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whether they possessed within their title was not argued, but rather 
what their title encompassed. Thus, Hooper II made its inference 
that the Hoopers were bringing a petitory action.55 It would appear 
then, that one cannot claim ownership through acquisitive prescrip-
tion without improperly cumulating a petitory action and possessory 
action, as establishing possession is necessary for acquisitive pre-
scription, which is a determination of ownership. Presumably there 
has been a mischaracterization of what constitutes a petitory action 
and/or possessory action.  
The First Circuit previously took up the same issues in Kadair 
v. Hampton,56 and perhaps made a bit more sense of the relationship 
between boundary, petitory, and possessory actions, and ownership 
by acquisitive prescription. First, Hooper II’s statement, “[b]ecause 
a judgment in a boundary action necessarily involves a preliminary 
determination of ownership, it arguably cannot be cumulated with a 
possessory action,”57 is arguably incorrect. Both the Civil Code and 
the Code of Civil Procedure provide that a boundary action may be 
used to determine ownership, as opposed to requiring a preliminary 
determination of ownership.58 Hooper II cites Kadair as authority 
holding that “proof of ownership is a necessary prerequisite to es-
tablishing [a] boundary.”59 However, this was taken from a narrow 
context in Kadair. Second, jurisprudence extensively supports that 
the type of possession necessary to establish ownership by acquisi-
tive prescription is identical to the type of possession necessary to 
maintain a possessory action.60 Thus—in contrast to Hooper II’s 
                                                                                                             
 55. See Hooper II at 971: “Importantly, for our purposes, the Hoopers as-
serted that the surplus property had been conveyed to them by title, as evidence 
by the phrase ‘one arpent more or less’ . . . effectively claim[ing] ownership of 
the property by title.”  
 56. Kadair v. Hampton, 13-1171 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/10/14); 146 So.3d 694, 
writ denied, 14-1709 (La. 11/7/14); 152 So.3d 177 (mem).  
 57. Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 970. 
 58. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 792, 794 (2017); LA. CIV. CODE OF PROC. art. 
3693 (2017).  
 59. Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 970. 
 60. Kadair, 146 So.3d at 703. 
292 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 10 
 
 
 
contention that asserting ownership by title and acquisitive prescrip-
tion is an improper cumulation61—not only should a boundary ac-
tion be “cumulatable” with a possessory action, in the case of ac-
quisitive prescription, they are mutually inclusive.  
Upon review of the Hoopers’ petition, they argued to have had 
“possession within title,” which on its face seems to create an im-
proper cumulation, though as abovementioned, the Hoopers had not 
expressly asserted a petitory action.62 Perhaps, regardless of whether 
it is permissible to assert ownership by acquisitive prescription and 
by title, had the Hoopers claimed that they were owners of the one 
arpent by good title, but also owners, separately, of the surplus 
through acquisitive prescription; then they may have avoided issues 
of improper cumulation altogether. However, by arguing that their 
title—per the language “more or less” than one arpent—conveyed 
to them the surplus, but that nonetheless they had possessed the sur-
plus for thirty-years through ancestors-in-title, the Hoopers did pre-
cisely what the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3657 pro-
hibits—plead in the alternative—and subjected themselves to a 
court’s inferences.  
CONCLUSION 
Hooper II seemed to lose sight of the ultimate goal of the ac-
tion—to fix a boundary—and provided debatable, largely unneces-
sary dicta on the relationships between petitory, possessory, bound-
ary, and acquisitive prescription actions. However, despite difficul-
ties navigating through the analysis of boundary, petitory, and pos-
sessory actions, Hooper II seemed to reach a result that more or less 
satisfies some principles of equity. Eventually, it was determined 
that the boundary be fixed according to principles of equal appor-
tionment, despite there being a “dearth of guidance” within Louisi-
ana’s jurisprudence on the matter, and remanded instructing the trial 
                                                                                                             
 61. LA. CIV. CODE art. 786 (2017).  
 62. See Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 268, 970; Yiannopoulos, supra note 52, at § 
11:31.  
2017] HOOPER V. HERO LANDS COMPANY 293 
 
 
 
court delineate a boundary with proper property description pursu-
ant to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1919. Seeing the 
glass half-full, the Hoopers may have lost a potential bit of land, but 
it was nonetheless established they own more than one arpent, grant-
ing them a piece of the surplus pie.63  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 63. Hooper II, 216 So.3d at 973. 
